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PROXY SOLICITATIONS: THE NEED FOR
EXPANDED DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
Corporate shareholders have a proprietary interest with re-
spect to the earnings, net assets, and control of the corpora-
tion.' Although the board of directors is generally responsible
for the determination and execution of corporate policy, 2 cer-
tain decisions must be made by the shareholders. The ambit
of shareholder control includes the election and removal of
directors, ratification of actions taken by the board of directors,
the adoption, amendment and repeal of by-laws, shareholder
resolutions and extraordinary corporate matters.3 These
decision-making powers are exercised either by voting in per-
son or by proxy4 at shareholder meetings. Today, however,
proxy voting is the dominant method of shareholder decision-
making in publicly held corporations.5 The proxy process is a
useful device, but in its operation it tends to favor management
rather than the shareholders.' Because it can be manipulated
by management in ways which effectively deprive the share-
holders of their franchise, proxy voting should be strictly
regulated.
Proxy voting is preferable to physical attendance at a share-
holders' meeting simply because it is more economical and
convenient for the typical individual shareholder. Shareholders
are often geographically dispersed, making attendance at the
meeting expensive and inconvenient.7 Most individual share-
holders, as opposed to institutional investors, are engaged in a
principal business other than investing and lack the time or
opportunity to attend the meeting.' Also, even if a shareholder
1. H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 157 (2d ed. 1970)
[hereinafter cited as HENN].
2. Id. § 207.
3. Id. § 188.
4. "The term 'proxy' is a contraction of 'procuracy' which means, among other
things, the act of officiating as an agent for another." N. LATTIN, THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 90 n. 80 (2d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as LATrIN].
5. Eisenberg, Access to the Corporate Proxy Machinery, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1489,
1490 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Eisenberg].
6. LATrIN, supra note 4, § 90.
7. Eisenberg, supra note 5. See F. EMERSON & F. LATcHAM, SHAREHOLDER
DEMOCRACY 14-15 (1954).
8. Eisenberg, supra note 5. For an analysis of shareholder expectations of participa-
tion in corporate decisionmaking, see Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and
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were to support or oppose certain matters slated for resolution,
he may not wish to speak on the issues at the meeting, but may
wish only to vote. In light of the disadvantages of physical
attendance, it is understandable that shareholders favor proxy
representation.
Proxy voting was not permitted at common law,9 but out of
necessity, modern corporate practice has evolved to the point
where all fifty states now permit it.10 The reasons for this evolu-
tion include the increase in both the size of corporations and
the number of shareholders, the separation of ownership and
management, and the resultant widespread distribution of cor-
porate securities.'" In the modern corporation "the entire con-
cept of the shareholders' meeting [is] at the mercy of the
proxy instrument."'' 2
The proxy relationship is commonly defined as the agency
created when a corporate shareholder authorizes the proxy
holder to represent him at the shareholder meeting by casting
the votes to which the shareholder is entitled by virtue of his
stock ownership. 13 The term "proxy" has traditionally been
used in several different contexts: the authority the share-
holder gives to his agent; the person appointed by the share-
holder (called the proxy holder); the instrument in which such
appointment is embodied; and the agent's exercise of the au-
thority. 4 In most agency relationships the principal instructs
the agent. The agent holding a corporate proxy, however,
usually has at his disposal more information relating to the
issues involved than does his principal, and therefore it is the
agent who determines the matter for which the agency will be
created as well as the manner in which it will be carried out.
Management in Modem Corporate Decisionmaking, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1969).
9. Axe, Corporate Proxies, 41 MICH. L. REV. 38 (1942). This article, in conjunction
with Axe, Corporate Proxies: II, 41 MICH. L. REV. 225 (1942), gives a general history of
the law of proxies.
10. See 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION, at 857-58 n.1 (2d ed. 1961 & Supp. 1969)
and 5 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION, at 2829-30 (2d ed. 1961 & Supp. 1969)
[hereinafter cited as 2 Loss or 5 Loss, respectively].
11. 1 L. Loss, SECURIrms REGULATION, at 8-19 (2d ed. 1961 & Supp. 1969)[here-
inafter cited as 1 Loss]. See also A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
12. 2 Loss, supra note 10, at 858.
13. W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAw OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2050 (rev.
perm. ed. 1975).
14. HENN, supra note 1, § 196.
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This distortion of the typical principal-agent relationship is
inherent in the present day corporate structure and makes pos-
sible many abuses of the proxy voting system.'5 A common
complaint is that the proxy system has often been abused by
corporate management who have used it "to perpetuate itself
in office, to formulate and execute self-serving policies, and to
render the corporation subservient to its will."'" Such conse-
quences often result when directors and officers withhold from
the stockholders the type of information necessary for share-
holders to vote their proxies intelligently.
The natural prerequisite of proxy voting is proxy solicita-
tion, the process whereby shareholders are systematically con-
tacted and advised to execute and return proxy cards which
authorize named proxies to cast the shareholder's votes either
in the manner indicated on the proxy card or at the proxy's
discretion. Since the purpose of the proxy instrument is to
facilitate the intelligent exercise of the stockholder's franchise,
the proxy solicitation process must fully and fairly inform the
shareholder of management policies and actions as well as
make available an instrument by which he can effectively ex-
press his personal judgments.17 In addition to facilitating intel-
ligent voting by the stockholder, the proxy instrument should
also provide a means for a shareholder to present his proposals
to the other shareholders for approval or disapproval.'8
The key to the effective enfranchisement of shareholders is
adequate disclosure in the proxy solicitation pro-
cess-providing the shareholder with the necessary facts to
enable him to make an intelligent decision on whether to grant
his proxy.'9 Inadequate disclosure can occur in a number of
ways. Partial disclosure, probably the most common and most
difficult to control, occurs when a stockholder is provided with
some information, but not enough to make a prudent choice.2
Misrepresentation is another form of inadequate disclosure
whereby fraudulent and misleading statements are made to
15. von Mehren & McCarroll, The Proxy Rules: A Case Study in the Administra-
tive Process, 29 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 728 (1964).
16. E. AmAow & H. EINHORN, PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL at 89 (2d
ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as ARANOW & EINHORN].
17. Id. at 90.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Comment, 1960 DUKE L.J. 623, 630 n. 28 [hereinafter cited as DUKE L.J.].
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deceive the shareholder into giving his proxy.2 Finally, there
is the deliberate omission of information, which if given, is
likely to keep the shareholder from returning his proxy.22
Congress has attempted to remedy the abuse of the proxy
solicitation process with regulations issued by the Securities
and Exchange Commission under section 14 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.23 State law, however, is a virtual void in
this respect. Most state laws do not even recognize the exist-
ence of proxy solicitation.' Needless to say, where there is no
recognition, there can be no regulation of abuse. In addition,
case law has failed to close the gap left by the state legislatures.
The common law has long recognized the right of a share-
holder to bring an action based on the fraudulent or deceitful
solicitation of a shareholder's proxy,25 but the courts have de-
fined adequate disclosure in the proxy solicitation process in
only a very vague and general way. In contrast to the states,
the federal government has met the problem head-on with the
Proxy Rules promulgated and administered by the Securities
and Exchange Commission (hereinafter SEC or Commission) .21
The presence of federal rules and a central administrative
mechanism for enforcing them may account in part for the
inaction of state legislatures in this particular area. The Proxy
Rules, however, are not extensive enough. They do not regu-
late the proxy solicitations of all public corporations, but only
those whose securities are either listed on a national exchange
or are equity securities issued by a corporation with assets of
more than one million dollars and held by 500 or more share-
holders. 7
The problem of protecting shareholders of publicly held cor-
porations not within the SEC's jurisdiction by providing them
with adequate disclosure in the proxy solicitation process re-
mains to be resolved. This comment will examine both the
federal and state approaches to the problem of adequate disclo-
sure in the proxy solicitation process and submit recommenda-
tions that would provide for greater investor protection.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970).
24. DuKE L.J. supra note 20, at 636.
25. See, e.g., ARAow & EINHORN, supra note 16, at 520.
26. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a et seq. (1976).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1) (1970).
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II. THE FEDERAL APPROACH AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE PROXY
RULES
The statutory basis for federal regulation of proxy solicita-
tions is section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.5
The congressional hearings that led to the passage of this act
identified serious abuses in the prevailing proxy solicitation
practices.
Fair corporate suffrage is an important right that should at-
tach to every security bought on a public exchange. Manage-
ments of properties owned by the investing public should not
be permitted to perpetuate themselves by the misuse of cor-
porate proxies, insiders having little or no substantial interest
in the properties they manage have often retained their con-
trol without an adequate explanation of the management pol-
icies they tend to pursue."
Recognizing that a regulatory device for the corporate proxy
system would necessarily be technical and complex, Congress
abandoned the more specific standards of the original bills and
delegated very broad powers to the Securities and Exchange
Commission .3  The only standards provided in the enabling
legislation were those inherent in such terms as "public inter-
est" and "protection of investors." Neither the form nor the
substance of the regulatory scheme was prescribed. Rather, the
entire problem of the nature and scope of federal proxy regula-
tion was left to the Commission to resolve. The Proxy Rules
as they have evolved since first published in 1935 represent
the Commission's exercise of this delegated duty. They dem-
onstrate a progressive expansion of federal control over the
proxy solicitation process by means of increasingly precise reg-
ulations. The rules promulgated under section 14 are princi-
pally designed to assure that shareholders are informed of those
facts regarding the resolutions to be considered at the share-
28. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970) reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securi-
ties exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or
for the protection of investors, to solicit or permit the use of his name to solicit
any proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any security (other than an
exempted security) registered pursuant to section 781 of this title.
29. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (r934).
30. The Commission was established by § 4(a) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1970).
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holders' meeting for which the proxy is solicited in order to
enable the shareholder to exercise his vote intelligently.31
The SEC published its first set of Proxy Rules, known as the
"LA Rules," on September 24, 1935.32 These seven rules were
so rudimentary, experimental, and inadequate that they were
hardly regulatory. They required the issuance of a proxy state-
ment containing a brief description of the matters to be consid-
ered at the forthcoming shareholders' meeting, prohibited false
or misleading statements, required the filing of proxy materials
at the time they were mailed to stockholders, and required
management to mail out any proxy materials that were sub-
mitted by shareholders. These rules were adopted as an interim
measure in spite of their inadequacies in order to prohibit the
circulation of false information. 3
It was readily apparent after only a few years that the LA
Rules failed to compel the amount of disclosure necessary to
make proxy solicitation effective. In some cases information
was furnished to stockholders on the back of a postcard.34 The
rules were therefore revised in 1938 and published as Regula-
31. Professor Louis Loss has commented on the usefulness of the proxy rules:
The proxy rules are very likely the most effective device in the SEC scheme
of things. The proxy literature, unlike the application for registration and the
statutory reports, gets into the hand of investors. Unlike the Securities Act
prospectus, it gets there in time. It is more readable than any of these other
documents. And it gets to a good many people who never see a prospectus ...
2 Loss, supra note 10, at 1027. Manuel F. Cohen, a former chairman of the Commission
has said:
The primary underlying concept of the proxy rule-consistent with the philoso-
phy of the statute-is that of disclosure. While the proxy regulation contains
procedural rules of one kind or another, these are designed in the main to make
effective the basic requirements and to permit freer communication among
security holders.
Cohen, The SEC and Proxy Contests, 20 FED. BAR J. 91, 98 (1960).
32. Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 378 (Class A), (Sept. 24, 1935) (Regulation LA), dis-
cussed in Aranow & Einhorn, Proxy Regulation: Suggested Improvements, 28 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 307, 309 (1959).
33. Securities and Exchange Commission Proxy Rules, Hearings on H.R. 1493,
1821, and H.R. 2019 Before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 78th Cong. 1st Sess., pt. I, 14-15 (1943) (testimony of Chairman Purcell):
Now, of course, the Commission knew that these rules would not give adequate
information to stockholders. It adopted the rules merely as a means of finding
out what types of information should be required in complying with the congres-
sional direction and also in the interim to prohibit false information from being
circulated to stockholders. It anticipated that later it would be able to adopt
affirmative rules of the type that Congress had in mind.
34. Id. at 15.
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tion X-14.15 This regulation, although amended several times,
remained in effect until the adoption of the Securities Acts
Amendments of 1964.36
The applicability of the Proxy Rules is, of course, limited
by the enabling legislation as well as by the rules themselves.
Prior to 1964, the Proxy Rules applied only to securities (other
than exempt securities)37 that were registered on any na-
tional securities exchange and, pursuant to other statutes, to
proxy solicitations involving public utility holding companies
and registered investment companies. Thus, prior to 1964, if
the corporation involved was not listed on a national exchange,
a registered investment company, a public utility holding com-
pany, or if it had been given "unlisted trading privileges on an
exchange, the SEC rules were inapplicable. As a result, ap-
proximately one-half of the larger corporations in the United
States were not within the scope of the SEC's jurisdiction. 8
Since the thrust of the rules was the protection of investors by
the regulation of proxy solicitations, many commentators criti-
cized the limited applicability of the rules.39
In view of these limitations, the SEC conducted three stud-
ies; two examined the proxy solicitation practices of unregis-
tered companies,40 while the other investigated the securities
markets.1 The abuses of the proxy system discovered by these
studies prompted the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964,
"the most significant statutory advance in federal securities
regulation and investor protection since 1940."42 While the
35. Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 1823 (Aug. 11, 1938).
36. Act of Aug. 20, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565.
37. Exempt securities include securities listed on national exchanges, securities of
registered investment companies, securities of savings and loan associations, non-
profit corporations, agricultural cooperatives, and other types of cooperatives. 15
U.S.C. § 78l(g)(2) (1970). U.S., state, and other governmental issues are generally
exempt from all federal regulations under 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(12) (1970).
38. Bayne, Around and Beyond the SEC-the Disenfranchised Stockholder, 26
INn. L.J. 207, 223 (1951).
39. See Aranow & Einhorn, Proxy Regulation: Suggested Improvements, 28 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 306 (1959); Brey, A Synopsis of the Proxy Rules, 26 CINN. L. REv. 58
(1957); Emerson & Latcham, SEC Proxy Regulation: Steps Toward More Effective
Stockholder Participation, 59 YALE L.J. 635 (1950); Friedman, SEC Regulation of
Corporate Proxies, 63 HARv. L. REv. 796 (1950).
40. SEC, A PROPOSAL TO SAFEGUARD INVESTORS IN UNREGISTERED SECURITIES (1946);
SEC, A PROPOSAL TO SAFEGUARD INVESTORS IN UNREGISTERED SECURITIES (1950).
41. SEC, Report of Special Study of Securities Markets, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
42. Sec. Act Rel. No. 4725 and Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 7425 (Sept. 15, 1964). The
[Vol. 60:11001106
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scope of the amendments extend far beyond mere corporate
proxy regulation, the key provision regarding proxy regulation
is section 12. This section expands the proxy solicitation re-
quirements of the Securities Exchange Act to include corpora-
tions involved in interstate commerce or in a business affecting
interstate commerce having total assets in excess of one million
dollars and a class of equity security held of record by 750 or
more persons (after July 1, 1966, by 500 or more persons)."
Today, the federal securities legislation regarding the proxy
solicitation process is contained in twelve rules and two sched-
ules in section 14a.14 These regulations detail precisely the form
and contents of the proxy, the informational materials which
must be supplied to the shareholder, as well as the timetable
for providing them. The effect of these rules is to assure that
the shareholders receive full and accurate information concern-
ing both the affairs of the corporation and of its officers.45 The
Commission has designed the rules in such a manner as to
make the proxy device the closest practicable substitute for
attendance at the shareholder meeting. As comprehensive as
these rules may be, however, they still fail to govern the sub-
stantial number of small publicly held corporations having as-
sets up to one million dollars and up to 500 stockholders. In
1971, there were 1,622,000 corporations with less than one mil-
lion dollars in assets and it can be estimated that today there
are an additional 250,000 corporations in this category.4 1
Proxy Rules have been referred to as "the salvation of our modem corporate system."
A Bill to Amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Hearings on S. 2408, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. 21 (1950).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1) (1970).
44. The rules are found in 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to 14a-12 (1976); the schedules
appear at 17 C.F.R. §§ 14a-101 and 14c-101 (1976).
45. For a discussion of the remedies available for violations of the proxy rules, see
APRAow & EINHORN, supra note 16, at 449-540.
46. The number of corporations in this category is difficult to estimate, but an
examination of corporate income tax returns statistics indicates that thousands of
active corporations have less than one million dollars in assets and, therefore, are not
subject to SEC regulation under 15 U.S.C. § 781(1) (1970). I.R.S., STATISTICS OF IN-
coME-1971 CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETURNs, at 3, table C (1975); I.R.S., STATISTICS
OF INCOME-1970 CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETURNS, at 3, table C (1974); I.R.S.,
STATISTICS OF INcOME-1969 CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETURNS, at 3, table C (1973);
I.R.S., STATISTICS OF INcOME-1968 CORPORATION INCOME TAX RaruRNS, at 3, table D
(1972); I.R.S., STATISTICS OF INco ME-1967 CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETUmNS, at 4,
table C (1971); I.R.S., STATISTICS OF INcoME-1966 CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETURNS,
at 2, table 1.3 (1970). There are no such statistics available as yet for the years 1971
to 1976, but the computations in Figure 1 make it possible to derive an approximation
of the present number of corporations having less than one million dollars in assets.
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Figure 1
Computation of Total Increase for Period 1967-1971 of
Corporations with Less than One Million Dollars in Assets
Number of Corporations with less Incremental Increase
Year than $One Million in Assets Per Year
1966 1,379,000 ---
1967 1,442,000 63,000
1968 1,443,000 1,000
1969 1,549,000 106,000
1970 1,559,000 10,000
1971 1,627,000 68,000
248,000 Total Increase
for five years
Assuming there was approximately the same total increase of 248,000 for the years 1971
to 1976 this would result in approximately 1,870,000 corporations in this category at
the close of 1976.
It should be evident that both the asset and security holder
tests are subject to manipulation. Many assets are "notoriously
incapable of exact valuation," and many shareholders are
listed under the "street name" designation of a broker rather
than in the names of the individual shareholders.47 This flexi-
bility enables borderline corporations to evade the Commis-
sion's regulations. Combine with this flexibility the many cor-
porations that are clearly outside the SEC's jurisdiction and
the possibilities for abuse and the need for expanded regulation
are obvious.
III. THE STATE APPROACH
The state legislatures have done nothing either to regulate
this system or to provide for standards of adequate disclosure
to shareholders. Every jurisdiction's corporate statutes author-
ize the use of the proxy, but for the most part these laws deal
only with the form, sufficiency, and revocability of the proxy.48
The statutes are silent on the issue of disclosure.
Two states, California and Oklahoma, have broken the si-
lence by enacting legislation dealing with the problem of ade-
quate disclosure. Their statutes, however, deal only with proxy
voting on amendments to the articles of incorporation. 9 The
47. ARANOW & EINHORN, supra note 16, at 95 n.33.
48. See 2 Loss, supra note 10, at 858.
49. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.154e (West 1971); CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 3637
(West 1955) and § 25148 (West Supp. 1976). Section 25148 authorizes the California
Commissioner of Corporations to require a proxy statement in certain cases either by
rule or order.
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only information that must be provided to shareholders is a
concise summary of the proposed amendment and the effect it
will have on shareholder rights. Failure to comply with the
statutory requirements, however, does not invalidate the
amendment.
Blue sky regulations, which govern securities transactions
within each state, are also silent on the issue.5 In the past the
blue sky laws of the various states differed considerably, but
they all failed to regulate the proxy solicitation process. State
securities regulations have become increasingly more uniform
since the adoption of the Uniform Securities Act in 1956 which
was designed to cover transactions "relating to securities; pro-
hibiting fraudulent practices in relation thereto; requiring the
registration of broker-dealers, agents, investment advisors, and
securities; and making uniform the law with reference thereto
"I1 However, the Act still does not regulate the solicitation
process. 5 Thus, although the Act has been adopted (or at least
substantially adopted with modifications) in thirty-four juris-
dictions,53 it has resulted merely in a system of state securities
regulation which uniformly overlooks the protection of inves-
tors once they have purchased their securities and attempt to
exercise their franchise.
The only disclosure protection most states do provide for
investors is that afforded to shareholders of insurance compa-
nies. These companies have traditionally been regulated by the
individual states, since the business of insurance has long been
regarded as not involved in interstate commerce .5 Unless their
50. See generally 1 Loss, supra note 10, at 32-34.
51. 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 4901.
52. The Uniform Securities Act is divided into four parts:
The first three parts represent the three basic "blue sky" philosophies: (I) the
"fraud" approach, (II) registration of broker-dealers, agents, and investment
advisors, and (1Il) registration of securities. Part IV contains those general provi-
sions (definitions, exemptions, judicial review, investigatory, injunctive and
criminal provisions, etc.) which are essential in varying degrees under any of the
three basic philosophies.
Id. For a discussion of the various types of blue sky philosophies, see 1 Loss, supra
note 11, at 33-34.
53. Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Ha-
waii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, Utah, Vir-
ginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming.
54. Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall 168 (1869), overruled in U.S. v. South-Eastern Under-
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stock is registered on a national stock exchange or if the com-
pany voluntarily registers under section 12 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, insurance companies are exempt from
SEC rules." However, in order for the insurance company to
qualify for such exemption, "[t]he solicitation of the com-
pany's proxies must be regulated in accordance with the norms
prescribed by the National Association of Insurance Commis-
sioners."" The norms provided by the Insurance Commission-
ers provide for adequate and timely disclosure of those matters
with respect to which the proxy is solicited, as well as the
general requirements as to the form and content of the proxy. 57
In order to permit domiciled insurance companies to qualify for
exemption most states now regulate the proxy solicitation pro-
cess of these companies either by statute or by statuorily au-
thorized rules issued by the commission of insurance.18
In suits brought by aggrieved shareholders seeking an in-
junction, a writ of mandamus or a writ of quo warranto, state
courts have been reluctant to examine the adequacy of disclo-
sure in proxy solicitation. This "judicial passivity"5 amounts
to disenfranchisement of stockholders who rely upon proxy rep-
resentation as their only means of participating in the affairs
of the corporation. Corporate management welcomes the judi-
ciary's laissez-faire attitude. Management views disclosure
requirements as an imposition and therefore, quite under-
standably, declines to voluntarily assume the burden of ade-
quate disclosure." Unless shareholders are fully and fairly in-
writers Ass'n, 332 U.S. 533 (1944), which held that an insurance company that con-
ducts a substantial part of its business across state lines is engaged in interstate
commerce and is subject to regulation by Congress under the commerce clause. But
see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1970) adopted in 1945, which restored to the states the power
to regulate the insurance business that may have been lost by the decision in U.S. v.
South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n.
55. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(2)(G) (1970).
56. Id. at (ii). The other two requirements are: (1) The corporation must file with
the appropriate state official(s) annual reports substantially complying with the forms
prescribed by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 15 U.S.C. §
781(g)(2)(G)(i) (1970); and (2) The purchase and sale of the corporation's securities by
insiders is subject to regulations which are substantially identical with Section 16 of
the Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(2)(G)(i) (1970).
57. Compare 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-1 to 12 (1976) with any state's proxy solicitation
rules for insurance companies, e.g., Wis. ADM. CODE Section Ins. 6.40 (1976).
58. See 5 Loss, supra note 10, at 2752-53.
59. DUKE L.J., supra note 20, at 623-24. This passivity also results in a scarcity of
case law on the subject.
60. Id. at 633.
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formed of the policies of the soliciting group, the right to ex-
press their opinions at shareholder meetings is effectively lost.
In those relatively rare cases where the courts do rule on the
adequacy of disclosure, they repeatedly fail to set forth and
explain the standards upon which their decision rests, but rely
instead on vague catchall phrases.' The absence of judicial
standards causes a lack of consistency and uniformity not only
among the various states but within the states as well. This
inconsistency is illustrated by two New York cases, In re
Scheuer62 and Matter of R. Hoe & Co."' Both cases involved
misrepresentation in the solicitation of proxies. The Scheuer
court found "deviations from the exacting standards of fairness
now generally agreed as incumbent upon those engaged in se-
curing proxies."64 The court failed, however, to delineate those
"exacting standards." The Hoe court, on the other hand, re-
fused to impose any such exacting standard. In fact, the court
declared that "a certain amount of innuendo, misstatement,
exaggeration and puffing must be allowed as a natural by-
product of a bitter proxy campaign."'" The court refused relief,
announcing that it would not disturb the action taken by share-
holders unless it was clearly established that the solicitation
was so tainted with fraud as to accomplish an inequitable
result.
Other New York cases have relied on this same standard.
That is, the solicitation must be so tainted with fraud that an
inequitable result is accomplished, or in the alternative, the
misrepresentation must affect the result of the election.6" Both
standards are much too broad to be helpful and create further
confusion and inconsistency.
61. For example, in Wyatt v. Armstrong, 186 Misc. 216, 59 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1945),
the court declared that it would set aside a corporate election if it found that the
methods used to solicit the proxies were "so clouded with doubt and tainted with
questionable circumstances that the standards of fair dealing" had been violated. Id.
at 220, 59 N.Y.S.2d at 505. The court, however, did not delineate what these standards
were. It merely concluded that the shareholders were deprived of their freedom to vote
at corporate elections after full disclosure of all relevant facts. Id. at 224, 59 N.Y.S.2d
at 508. This case fails to provide proxy solicitors with any workable standards of
disclosure.
62. 59 N.Y.S.2d 500 (1942).
63. 14 Misc. 2d 500, 137 N.Y.S.2d 142 (1954), aff'd mem. 285 App. Div. 927, 139
N.Y.S.2d 883, aff'd mem., 309 N.Y. 719, 128 N.E.2d 420 (1955).
64. 59 N.Y.S.2d at 501.
65. 14 Misc. 2d at 505, 137 N.Y.S.2d at 147-48.
66. Dal-Tran Service Co. v. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 14 App. Div. 2d 349, 220
N.Y.S.2d 549 (1961). See also Skora v. Great Sweet Grass Oils Ltd., 30 Misc. 2d 572,
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The Delaware Court of Chancery adopted a vague test of
adequate disclosure based on whether an omission or misrepre-
sentation in a proxy solicitation was material. Empire South-
ern Gas Co. v. Gray"7 relied on this material misrepresentation
test. In Empire the solicitation data was signed "By Authority
of the Board of Directors," when in fact there was no such
authority. The court held that the misrepresentation was mate-
rial and invalidated the election. In Kaufman v. Shoenburg"
the issue was the materiality of the officers' failure to advise
stockholders of an existing incentive compensation plan when
soliciting proxies regarding the adoption of a similar plan in
which the officers would have participated. The court found
that it was not a material omission because some reference was
made to "additional compensation" received by the directors.
The court's language, however, indicated that the omission of
material information when soliciting proxies would be cause to
invalidate the proxy. Thus, while Delaware protects sharehold-
ers from material omissions and misrepresentations, it does
little to protect the shareholder from those soliciting groups
who simply provide too little information.
The state courts have not only failed to supply workable
minimum standards of disclosure, but in addition have not
appropriated existing federal standards.69 On the whole, they
have treated the SEC rules as exclusively federal in applica-
tion. A number of cases have held that a state court has no
jurisdiction to hear or determine alleged violations of the Proxy
Rules. 0 The basis for these holdings is the language of section
27 of the Act: "The district courts of the United States . . .
shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this chapter or
the rules and regulations thereunder.""
Illustrative of this attitude is American Hardware Corpora-
tion v. Savage Arms Corporation.2 The issue in this case was
205 N.Y.S.2d 98 (1960) (applying the law of Ontario, Canada).
67. 29 Del. Ch. 95, -, 46 A.2d 741, 744 (1946).
68. 33 Del. Ch. 211, 91 A.2d 786 (1952).
69. For a review of disclosure requirements in the state courts, see DUKE L.J., supra
note 12; Aranow & Einhorn, State Court Review of Corporate Elections, 56 COLUM. L.
REV. 155 (1956).
70. See, e.g., Standard Power & Light Corp. v. Investment Assoc., 29 Del. Ch. 225,
51 A.2d 572, 579 (1947), af'g, 29 Del. Ch. 225, 48 A.2d 501 (1946); Eliasberg v. Stan-
dard Oil Co., 23 N.J. Super. 431, 92 A.2d 862, 869 (1952), aff'd, 12 N.J. 467, 97 A.2d
437 (1953).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1970).
72. 37 Del. Ch. 59, 136 A.2d 690 (1957).
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whether the proxy statement complied with the SEC Proxy
rules, and whether, as a matter of state law, the proxy state-
ment was false or misleading. The Delaware court, however,
declined to invade the exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC and the
federal courts: "Whether or not there has been noncompliance
with the Proxy Rules of the Commission is an issue to be deter-
mined solely by the Commission itself and the Federal Courts.
The Courts of this state will not assume to trespass upon their
exclusive jurisdiction."73
The courts have generally avoided the issue of whether the
SEC's rules and regulations could or should be used for evalu-
ating the proxy solicitation processes of non-SEC regulated
corporations. Carter v. Portland General Electric Co.74 demon-
strates the less than hospitable reception that the federal proxy
rules have received from the state courts. Although the corpo-
ration involved in Carter was not subject to the SEC regula-
tions, the Oregon Supreme Court was asked to adopt judicially
the federal proxy rules and to apply them to any corporate
dispute that was covered by state rather than federal law. The
court refused to adopt the SEC rules claiming that such action
was appropriate only for the legislature.
In O'Conner v. Fergang5 the New York court implied that
if the occasion presented itself, the SEC's Proxy Rules would
be considered as the standard for adequate disclosure in a
non-SEC regulated proxy battle. One year later, the issue was
directly presented in Bresnick v. Home Title Guaranty Co., 6
in which the plaintiff contended that the proxies were "im-
properly, unfairly and illegally" obtained. The district court
applying New York law, was urged to follow the SEC rules even
though the securities involved were unlisted, but this sugges-
tion was rejected by the court. Instead, it dismissed the SEC
rules as "technical," claiming that "the test is not compliance
with the technical rules, but rather whether the proxy-
soliciting material was so tainted with fraud that an inequita-
73. 136 A.2d at 693.
74. 227 Or. 401, -, 362 P.2d 766, 769 (1961).
75. 14 Misc. 2d 1095, 1097, 182 N.Y.S.2d 942, 943-44 (1958), wherein the court
stated: "Be it noted that in this case the notices and proceedings were not subject to
the Securities and Exchange Commission Regulations. But even accepting such stan-
dards, the communications here do not vary substantially from other proxy battles
under S.E.C. Regulations."
76. 175 F. Supp. 723 (S.D. N.Y. 1959).
77. Id. at 724.
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ble result was accomplished.""
One notable exception to the general refusal of state and
federal courts to use SEC standards when evaluating proxy
solicitations of corporations not governed by the SEC is
Stockholders Committee For Better Management of Erie Tech-
nological Products, Inc. v. Erie Technological Products, Inc.79
In this 1965 case the federal district court relied on the SEC
Proxy Rules, but did so recognizing that the corporation would
soon be subject to the SEC's administration pursuant to the
1964 amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
In sum, while the courts have provided relief for individual
stockholders, they have failed to provide workable standards to
protect stockholders as a class.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The foregoing analysis demonstrates the failure to realize
the original congressional goal of uniform investor protection.
Too many shareholders in small publicly held corporations out-
side the scope of the SEC regulation are not given adequate
protection against misleading proxy solicitation. To guarantee
stockholders the necessary information required for the intelli-
gent exercise of their franchise, it is necessary to establish min-
imum disclosure requirements. These standards can be pro-
vided by Congress, the courts, or the state legislatures.
Congress could expand the scope of the SEC's control to
include all proxy solicitations of public issue corporations. The
inherent limitation in this approach, however, is Congress'
power to regulate only interstate commerce or businesses af-
fecting interstate commerce."0 At present this constitutional
restraint on the power of the SEC allows a substantial number
of corporations to escape the supervision of the Commission
under the claim of purely local commerce.
The state courts should give great weight to the Proxy
78. Id. at 725. Other federal courts in diversity cases have likewise refused to follow
the federal proxy rules when dealing with non-SEC regulated corporations. In Western
Oil Fields, Inc. v. McKnab, 232 F. Supp. 162, 164 (D. Colo. 1964), the court declared
that when an injunction is sought under state law, a stronger showing of fraud must
be made than that required under the SEC rules. In Federal Home Loan Bank v.
Greater Del. Val. Fed. Say. & L. Ass'n., 277 F.2d 437, 439-40 (3rd Cir. 1960), the court
could not be persuaded to apply the SEC rules to a non-SEC regulated corporation.
79. 248 F. Supp. 380, 384-85 (W.D. Pa. 1965).
80. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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Rules of the SEC when assessing the adequacy of disclosure in
a particular solicitation case. These rules would provide the
courts with clear, functional standards with which to evaluate
solicitation materials and procedures. The drawback to relying
solely on the judiciary for investor protection is that judicial
action is remedial in nature and operates only on an ad hoc
basis. What is needed in this instance is a uniform system of
shareholder protection that is designed to prevent the effective
disenfranchisement of shareholders by abuse of the proxy
system.
It is therefore incumbent upon the state legislatures to es-
tablish a uniform system of proxy solicitation rules. These reg-
ulations are best patterned after, if not made identical to, the
federal proxy rules, for the federal rules represent the combined
knowledge of securities regulation experts, the product of de-
tailed research, and years of experience. The states cannot, of
course, regulate beyond their respective boundaries; thus a
nationwide uniform system is required. The advantage in rely-
ing on the states as opposed to the federal government is the
ability to regulate wholly intrastate commerce. The states
should provide that compliance with the SEC regulations is
automatic compliance with the state rules, so that overlap with
the federal regulatory system would pose no problem. The net
effect of this type of dual plan is the protection of all investors
in any size public issue corporation, whether engaged in inter-
state commerce or not.
MARGARET BARR BRUEMMER
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